Complementarity in R&D Cooperation Strategies

32 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2005

See all articles by René Belderbos

René Belderbos

University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation; Maastricht University - Department of Organization & Strategy

Martin A. Carree

University of Maastricht - Department of Organization & Strategy

Boris Lokshin

Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

This paper assesses the performance effects of simultaneous engagement in R&D cooperation with different partners (competitors, clients, suppliers, and universities & research institutes). We test whether these different types of R&D cooperation are complements in improving productivity. The results suggest that the joint adoption of cooperation strategies could be either beneficial or detrimental to firm performance, depending on the specific combination of strategies and firm size. Customer cooperation helps to increase market acceptance and diffusion of product innovations and so enhances the impact of competitor and university cooperation. On the other hand, smaller firms in particular also face diseconomies in pursuing multiple R&D cooperation strategies, which may stem from higher costs and complexity of simultaneously managing multiple partnerships with different innovation objectives.

Keywords: Innovation, productivity, R&D cooperation

JEL Classification: O31, O32

Suggested Citation

Belderbos, Rene and Carree, Martin A. and Lokshin, Boris, Complementarity in R&D Cooperation Strategies (February 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=671644 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.671644

Rene Belderbos

University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32 16 32 6912 (Phone)
+32 16 32 6732 (Fax)

Maastricht University - Department of Organization & Strategy ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Martin A. Carree

University of Maastricht - Department of Organization & Strategy ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Boris Lokshin (Contact Author)

Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31 43 388 3697 (Phone)
+31 43 325 4893 (Fax)

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