You are Not in My Boat: Common Fate and Discrimination Against Outgroup Members

12 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2005

See all articles by Daniel John Zizzo

Daniel John Zizzo

University of Queensland - School of Economics

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

Sharing a common fate with some people but not others may affect how economic agents behave in economic transactions, quite independently of strategic incentives. We present an experimental test of the effect of perceptions of common fate in bargaining games. No discrimination was found in a coordination game, a Nash demand game and an ultimatum game. In settings where the bargaining power was all with one subject (the dictator game and a 'unilateral power game'), about half of the subjects engaged in negative discrimination: insiders were not treated better relative to control sessions, but outsiders were treated worse.

Keywords: bargaining, dictator game, discrimination

JEL Classification: C72, C78, C91

Suggested Citation

Zizzo, Daniel John, You are Not in My Boat: Common Fate and Discrimination Against Outgroup Members (January 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=675223 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.675223

Daniel John Zizzo (Contact Author)

University of Queensland - School of Economics ( email )

St Lucia
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia

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