Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - an Experimental Investigation and Some Theoretical Insights
CERGE-EI Working Paper No. 210
Posted: 24 Apr 2005
Date Written: June 2003
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.
Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions, Demand Reduction, Experimental Economics
JEL Classification: D44, C91
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation