Takeover Defense, Ownership Structure and Stock Returns in the Netherlands: An Empirical Analysis

Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 97–109, 1997.

Posted: 23 Aug 1998 Last revised: 23 Nov 2012

See all articles by Rezaul Kabir

Rezaul Kabir

University of Twente - Department of Finance and Accounting

Dolph Cantrijn

Tilburg University

Andreas Jeunink

Independent

Date Written: Jan. 1, 1997

Abstract

This study empirically examines the relationships between a firm’s takeover defenses and its ownership structure and stock returns. Analyzing data of Dutch listed companies, we find that multiple antitakeover defenses are increasingly adopted when firms are characterized by relatively lower ownership concentration. The evidence supports the hypothesis that more concentrated ownership of shares provides more effective monitoring of managers. As defense by issuing preferred share has recently been the most widely adopted mechanism in the Netherlands, its impact on shareholders’ wealth is also analyzed. We observe the presence of two opposing effects of this antitakeover measure.

Keywords: Antitakeover measure, Ownership structure, Stock returns, Event study

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Kabir, Rezaul and Cantrijn, A.L.R. (Dolph) and Jeunink, Andreas, Takeover Defense, Ownership Structure and Stock Returns in the Netherlands: An Empirical Analysis (Jan. 1, 1997). Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 97–109, 1997.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6760

Rezaul Kabir

University of Twente - Department of Finance and Accounting ( email )

Faculty of Behavioral, Management & Social Science
P. O. Box 217
Enschede, 7500 AE
Netherlands
+31 53 489 4512 (Phone)
+31 53 489 2159 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://people.utwente.nl/r.kabir

A.L.R. (Dolph) Cantrijn (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

Postbus 90153
Room B734
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
31-13 663188/663043 (Phone)
31-13 662875 (Fax)

Andreas Jeunink

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

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