The Choice of Ownership Structure: Evidence from Russian Mass Privatization

EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings

ICEF Working Paper

42 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2005 Last revised: 25 Jun 2009

See all articles by Carsten Sprenger

Carsten Sprenger

University of Glasgow; New Economic School (NES)

Date Written: April 10, 2009

Abstract

In a comprehensive data set of 530 Russian manufacturing firms we observe high and gradually decreasing ownership stakes of firm insiders, i.e. managers and workers. We estimate the determinants of the decision to privatize a firm in the mass privatization program (1992-94) and of the resulting initial ownership distribution. For estimating the latter we use a tobit model with sample selection. The paper presents empirical tests for predictions of the model of ownership choice in insider privatization by Aghion and Blanchard (1998). In particular, we find that collusion among workers is important in their decision to sell shares to outsiders and raises their stake. Also, firms in financial distress show a higher incidence of insiders selecting the option of privatization leading to high insider ownership. This can be explained by the desire of insiders to insure against unemployment by acquiring more shares in those companies. No evidence is found of a sequencing in privatization according to the performance of firms before privatization.

Keywords: Privatisation, ownership structure, insider ownership, transition, Russia, tobit model with selection

JEL Classification: C24, G32, L33, P31

Suggested Citation

Sprenger, Carsten, The Choice of Ownership Structure: Evidence from Russian Mass Privatization (April 10, 2009). EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings, ICEF Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=676882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.676882

Carsten Sprenger (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow ( email )

Adam Smith Business School
Glasgow, Scotland G12 8LE
United Kingdom

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

3, Nobel st.
Innovation Center, Skolkovo
Moscow, Skolkovo 121205
Russia

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