Odious Securitization

7 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2005

See all articles by Anupam Chander

Anupam Chander

University of California, Davis - School of Law; Georgetown University Law Center


The odious debt doctrine exposes a fundamental dilemma in international finance - the desire not to saddle a population with a debt to which it did not consent and from which it did not benefit, coupled with a practical need to ensure that capital continues to flow. The odious debt doctrine would undermine international debt obligations of a state that are entered into (1) without the consent of the people; (2) not for the benefit of the people; and (3) both of the above with the knowledge of the creditors. This Essay raises questions about the doctrine with respect to each of these criteria: (1) Given the dazzling variety of modern financial products, how should we define the types of debt obligations subject to the doctrine? (2) Should the fact that the proceeds of a loan are used in part for the commonweal defeat the application of the doctrine? (3) Should the broad, deep, and faceless capital markets offer an escape from culpability for the financiers of international delicts because public bondholders are to be presumed unfamiliar with the credit? The Essay offers observations on each of these issues.

Keywords: international finance, odious debt, securitization, Iraq, occupation, international bonds

Suggested Citation

Chander, Anupam, Odious Securitization. Emory Law Journal, Vol. 53, p. 923, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=678363

Anupam Chander (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )

400 Mrak Hall Drive
Davis, CA 95616-5201
United States
530-754-5304 (Phone)
530-754-5311 (Fax)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

Washington, DC

HOME PAGE: http://Chander.org

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