Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting

Posted: 24 Mar 2005

See all articles by Akhmed Akhmedov

Akhmed Akhmedov

Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Abstract

This paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade-old democracy - Russia - finds strong evidence of cycles, and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence. Using regional monthly panel data, we find that (1) the budget cycle is sizable and short-lived; public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters; (2) the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy, government transparency, media freedom, voter awareness, and over time; and (3) preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents' chances for reelection. The short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies.

Suggested Citation

Akhmedov, Akhmed and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 4, November 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=678662

Akhmed Akhmedov

Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) ( email )

47 Nakhimovsky Prospect, Office #720
117418 Moscow
Russia
+7 09 5332 4083 (Phone)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
499
PlumX Metrics