Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors

26 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2005

See all articles by David Coen

David Coen

University College London - Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP)

Abstract

Economic regulators are accountable to politicians - both government and ministers - parallel regulatory authorities, such as cartel offices, consumers and regulatees. This article investigates how the relationship between regulators and stakeholders evolves as a function of market developments and political learning. Drawing on a comparative case study of the UK and German telecommunication sector, the paper illustrates how regulators constrained by administrative and business traditions have asserted their discretion over politicians by developing sophisticated political relationship with a wide range of stakeholders. The paper concludes that while regulators have undoubtedly diverged from the initial delegation of powers, there is little evidence to suggest that European regulators will converge on a single regulatory model.

Suggested Citation

Coen, David, Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors. Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 59-84, March 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=679644

David Coen (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP) ( email )

London, W1T 6EY
United Kingdom
020 7679 4967 (Phone)
020 7679 4969 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/people/david_coen.php

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