Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System

32 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2005

See all articles by Hans Pitlik

Hans Pitlik

Universitaet Hohenheim

Friedrich Schneider

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Harald Strotmann

Pforzheim University

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to overrepresented states. The present paper analyses empirically the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany's intergovernmental transfer system over the period 1970-2002. It can be shown that overrepresented states in the upper house receive disproportionate shares of transfers, while malapportionment in the lower house does not seem to matter. We also find empirical evidence that overrepresentation became more important over time.

Keywords: legislative bargaining, overrepresentation, fiscal transfer system, Germany

JEL Classification: D7, H77

Suggested Citation

Pitlik, Hans and Schneider, Friedrich G. and Strotmann, Harald, Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System (March 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=680509

Hans Pitlik (Contact Author)

Universitaet Hohenheim ( email )

520D
70593 Stuttgart
Germany

Friedrich G. Schneider

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics ( email )

Altenbergerstrasse 69
A-4040 Linz, 4040
Austria
+43 732 2468 8210 (Phone)
+43 732 2468 8208 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Harald Strotmann

Pforzheim University ( email )

Tiefenbronner Str. 65
75175 Pforzheim
Germany

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