The Changing Role of Economics in Competition Policy Decisions by the European Commission During the Monti Years

Competition Policy International, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2005

23 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2005

See all articles by Carsten Grave

Carsten Grave

Linklaters LLP

David S. Evans

Global Economics Group; University College London

Abstract

This paper examines the evolution of the use of economics in EC competition policy matters and the reforms in the use of economics that occurred in the latter part of EC Competition Commissioner Mario Monti's term (1999-2004). Under his predecessors, the use of economics had been steadily increasing for many years. The revolutionary reforms under Commissioner Monti were triggered when the Court of First Instance (CFI) voided, in quick succession, three merger prohibitions adopted by the European Commission. The CFI criticized the Commission for relying on unverified economic theories. The reforms rapidly had an impact on merger analysis at the Commission. It is unclear, however, whether the Commission will embrace the use of sound economic analysis for abuse of dominance inquiries in the absence of a clear mandate from the EC courts to do so.

Suggested Citation

Grave, Carsten and Evans, David S., The Changing Role of Economics in Competition Policy Decisions by the European Commission During the Monti Years. Competition Policy International, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=681287

Carsten Grave

Linklaters LLP ( email )

Königsallee 49-51
Düsseldorf, 40212
Germany

David S. Evans (Contact Author)

Global Economics Group ( email )

111 Devonshire St.
Suite 900
Boston, MA 02108
United States

University College London ( email )

Gower St
London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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