39 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2005
Date Written: January 21, 2005
We develop a model of a two-division firm in which the strong division has, on average, higher quality investment projects than the weak division. We show that the firm optimally biases its project selection policy in favor of the weak division and this bias is stronger when there is a greater spread in average project quality. The cost of such a policy is that the firm sometimes funds an inferior project but the benefit is that it motivates the manager of the strong division to set (and meet) more aggressive cash flow targets.
Keywords: Internal capital markets, conglomerates, project selection
JEL Classification: G31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bernardo, Antonio E. and Luo, Jiang and Wang, James J. D., A Theory of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets (January 21, 2005). AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=683727 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.683727