On the Lobbying Behavior Response to Political Asymmetries in International Economic Integration

Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 506-529, March 2003

Posted: 11 Apr 2005

See all articles by I-Hui Cheng

I-Hui Cheng

National University of Kaohsiung - Department of Applied Economics

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of political asymmetries on a FTA and a CU. I have shown that either a higher lobbying sensitivity to the foreign firm or a more susceptibility of politicians to lobbying are sufficient to lead to a higher tariff protection at the individual country level. Under a CU, firms may dislike any form of political dominance in the common trade policy unless politicians do not discriminate against foreign lobbyists significantly. In contrast, under a FTA, if politicians are very susceptible to lobbying, the results appear to be ambiguous.

Keywords: Economic integration, protection, lobbying

JEL Classification: D72, F13, F15

Suggested Citation

Cheng, I-Hui, On the Lobbying Behavior Response to Political Asymmetries in International Economic Integration. Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 506-529, March 2003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=685761

I-Hui Cheng (Contact Author)

National University of Kaohsiung - Department of Applied Economics ( email )

700, Kaohsiung University Rd.
National University of Kaohsiung
Kaohsiung, 811
Taiwan

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