On the Lobbying Behavior Response to Political Asymmetries in International Economic Integration
Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 506-529, March 2003
Posted: 11 Apr 2005
The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of political asymmetries on a FTA and a CU. I have shown that either a higher lobbying sensitivity to the foreign firm or a more susceptibility of politicians to lobbying are sufficient to lead to a higher tariff protection at the individual country level. Under a CU, firms may dislike any form of political dominance in the common trade policy unless politicians do not discriminate against foreign lobbyists significantly. In contrast, under a FTA, if politicians are very susceptible to lobbying, the results appear to be ambiguous.
Keywords: Economic integration, protection, lobbying
JEL Classification: D72, F13, F15
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation