Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

27 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2005

See all articles by Aart de Zeeuw

Aart de Zeeuw

Tilburg University - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. In the context of a repeated game, this implies that large stable coalitions can also be sustained over time by a simple trigger mechanism, for large enough discount factors. However, if changes in time implement changes in state, this conclusion does not hold anymore: only small stable coalitions can be sustained.

Keywords: IEA's, Coalitional stability, Dynamics

JEL Classification: Q2, C70, F42

Suggested Citation

de Zeeuw, Aart J., Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements (March 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=688961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.688961

Aart J. De Zeeuw (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2065 (Phone)
+31-13-466-3042 (Fax)

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