On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups
23 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2005
Date Written: April 2006
Abstract
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore, interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Keywords: Spatial voting models, electoral competition, winning set, interest groups
JEL Classification: D71, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sadiraj, Vjollca and Tuinstra, Jan and Van Winden, F. A. A. M., On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups (April 2006). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1698, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=689822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.689822
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