The Struggle Over Migration Policy

33 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2005

See all articles by Gil S. Epstein

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Shmuel Nitzan

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the endogenous determination of migration quota viewing it as an outcome of a two-stage political struggle between two interest groups: those in favor and those against the proposed migration quota. We first compare the proposed policies of the two interest groups under random behavior of the government, with and without lobbying. The paper proceeds with the examination of the effect of government intervention in the proposal of the quota on its nature, assuming that, with and without government intervention, the uncertain approval of the proposal is the outcome of a lobbying contest between the two interest groups. Finally, we examine the effect that the status-quo policy has on the proposed government's policy.

Keywords: migration quota, interest groups, government intervention

JEL Classification: J61, J81

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Gil S. and Nitzan, Shmuel, The Struggle Over Migration Policy (March 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=690149 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.690149

Gil S. Epstein (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~epsteig/

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University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

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Shmuel Nitzan

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972.3.531.8930 (Phone)
+972.3.535.3180 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

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