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Capital Budgeting and Delegation

Posted: 17 Apr 2005  

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Abstract

As part of our ongoing research into capital budgeting processes as responses to decentralized information and incentive problems, we focus in this paper on when a level of a managerial hierarchy will delegate the allocation of capital across projects and time to the level below it. In our model, delegation is a way to save on costly investigation of proposed projects. Therefore, it is more extensive the larger are the costs of such investigations. This delegation takes advantage of the fact that the lower-level manager's preferences are assumed to be similar (though not identical) to those of the higher level.

Keywords: Capital Budgeting Processes, Delegation

JEL Classification: G31

Suggested Citation

Harris, Milton and Raviv, Artur, Capital Budgeting and Delegation. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 259-289, December 1998. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=690801

Milton Harris (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Finance ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-2549 (Phone)
(773) 753-8310 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/milton.harris/

Artur Raviv

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8342 (Phone)
847-491-5719 (Fax)

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