Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 733-769, Fall 2010

36 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2005 Last revised: 14 Oct 2015

See all articles by Florian Ederer

Florian Ederer

Yale School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2009

Abstract

We investigate the choice to conduct interim performance evaluations in a dynamic tournament. When a worker's ability does not influence the marginal benefit of effort, the choice depends on the shape of the cost of effort function. When effort and ability are complementary, feedback has several competing effects: it informs workers about their relative position in the tournament (evaluation effect) as well as their relative productivity (motivation effect) and it creates signal-jamming incentives to exert effort prior to the performance evaluation. These effects suggest a trade-off of performance feedback between evaluation and motivation which is in accordance with organizational behavior research and performance appraisal practices.

Keywords: Feedback, Motivation, Tournaments, Interim Evaluation

JEL Classification: M12, M51

Suggested Citation

Ederer, Florian, Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments (June 2009). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 733-769, Fall 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=691384 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.691384

Florian Ederer (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/florianederer/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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