Pay-Performance Sensitivity: An Analysis of Japanese Compensation

IB-95-2

Posted: 22 Aug 1998

See all articles by Lee-Seok Hwang

Lee-Seok Hwang

Seoul National University - College of Business Administration

Helen K. Snider

New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting

Date Written: No Date

Abstract

The pay-performance sensitivity of Japanese CEO compensation is systematically associated with both firm characteristicsand individual attributes as invoked from agency theory and human capital theory. The results support the hypothesis that continuous monitoring by the main bank and other member firms of the same business group contributes to aligning the interests of Japanese CEOs with those of outside shareholders through an enhanced sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance. Additionally, firm size, and the CEO's age and tenure as CEO influence pay- performance sensitivity in Japanese firms.

JEL Classification: J33

Suggested Citation

Hwang, Lee-Seok and Snider, Helen K., Pay-Performance Sensitivity: An Analysis of Japanese Compensation (No Date ). IB-95-2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6921

Lee-Seok Hwang

Seoul National University - College of Business Administration ( email )

Seoul, 151-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Helen K. Snider (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting ( email )

40 West 4th Street
Suite 10-180
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0423 (Phone)
212-995-422l (Fax)

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