Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation

2 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2005

See all articles by Michael Finus

Michael Finus

University of Stirling

Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties.

Keywords: International environmental agreements, Timing of participation decision

JEL Classification: C72, D70, H41, Q50

Suggested Citation

Finus, Michael and Rundshagen, Bianca, Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation (March 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 45.05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=692502 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.692502

Michael Finus (Contact Author)

University of Stirling ( email )

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen ( email )

Profilstr. 8
Hagen, D-58084
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
98
Abstract Views
838
rank
273,024
PlumX Metrics