64 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2005
Date Written: March 15, 2005
Welfare economics suggests that the tax system is the appropriate place to effect redistribution from those with more command over material resources to those with less - that is, in short, to serve "equity." Society should set other mechanisms of private and public law, including public finance systems, to maximize welfare - that is, in short, to serve "efficiency." The populace, however, may not always accept first-best policies. Perspectives from cognitive psychology suggest that ordinary citizens can react to the purely formal means by which social policies are implemented, and thus may reject welfare-improving reforms.
This Article sets out the general background of the problem. We present the results of original experiments that confirm that the means of implementing redistribution affect its acceptability. Effects range from such seemingly trivial matters as whether or not tax burdens are discussed in dollars or in percent terms, to more substantial matters such as how many different individual taxes there are, whether the burden of taxes is transparent or not, and the nature and level of the public provision of goods and services. The findings suggest a deep and problematic tension between the goals of equity and efficiency in public finance.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
McCaffery, Edward J. and Baron, Jonathan, The Political Psychology of Redistribution (March 15, 2005). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 05-11; USC Legal Studies and Law & Econ Research Paper No. 05-8; USC CLEO Research Paper No. C05-4. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=695305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.695305