Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?

33 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2005

See all articles by Michael Lokshin

Michael Lokshin

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG); National Research University Higher School of Economics

Ruslan Yemtsov

World Bank - Social Proteciton and Jobs Global Practice

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

In this paper we use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to analyze the distributional and welfare implications of the military draft. We focus on draft avoidance as a common response to highly unpopular conscription system ridden by corruption. We develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment. We employ several econometric techniques to estimate the effect of various household characteristics on the probability to serve in the army and the implications for household income. Our results indicate that the burden of conscription falls disproportionately on the poor. Poor, low-educated, rural households are much more likely to have their sons enlisted compared to urban, wealthy and better-educated families. The losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and exceed the statutory rates of personal income taxes.

Keywords: Military draft, distribution, public policy, Russia

JEL Classification: D12, I32, J31

Suggested Citation

Lokshin, Michael and Yemtsov, Ruslan, Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft? (March 2005). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3547. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=695501 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.695501

Michael Lokshin (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

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National Research University Higher School of Economics

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Ruslan Yemtsov

World Bank - Social Proteciton and Jobs Global Practice ( email )

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