Time to Complete and Research Joint Ventures: A Differential Game Approach

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-29

33 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2005

See all articles by Jorge Navas

Jorge Navas

University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics

Peter M. Kort

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

In this paper we analyze cooperation in R&D in the form of RJVs.We show that the optimal size of an RJV does not only depend on the degree of spillovers, as literature suggests, but also on the cost function of R&D activities. Moreover, the explicit consideration of the fact that R&D projects take time to complete shows that benefits from cooperation in R&D not only allow RJVs to carry out larger R&D projects, but also to reduce the time to completion for projects with a given size and, consequently, to accelerate the acquisition of the benefits associated with the innovation.

Keywords: Differential games, research joint ventures, time to complete

JEL Classification: C73, L13, O31

Suggested Citation

Navas, Jorge and Kort, Peter, Time to Complete and Research Joint Ventures: A Differential Game Approach (February 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-29, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=695743 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.695743

Jorge Navas (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics ( email )

Avda. Diagonal 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Peter Kort

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2062 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3072 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/kort/

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2062 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3072 (Fax)

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