J. OF FINANCE, Vol. 50 No. 5, December 1995
Posted: 20 Jul 1998
This paper examines the structure of staged venture capital investments when agency and monitoring costs exist. Expected agency costs increase as assets become less tangible, growth options increase, and asset specificity rises. Data from a random sample of 794 venture capital-backed firms support the predictions. Venture capitalists concentrate investments in early stage and high technology companies where informational asymmetries are highest. Decreases in intensities lead to more frequent monitoring. Venture capitalists periodically gather information and maintain the option to discontinue funding projects with little probability of going public.
JEL Classification: G31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gompers, Paul A., Optimal Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture Capital. J. OF FINANCE, Vol. 50 No. 5, December 1995. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6971