Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies

16 Pages Posted: 16 May 2005

See all articles by Hideyuki Mizobuchi

Hideyuki Mizobuchi

University of British Columbia - Department of Economics

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: January 19, 2005

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: There is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaued domain.

Keywords: Strategy-Proofness, Social Choice Function, Allotment Economy, Uniform Rule

JEL Classification: D61, D63, D71, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Mizobuchi, Hideyuki and Serizawa, Shigehiro, Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies (January 19, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=697661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.697661

Hideyuki Mizobuchi

University of British Columbia - Department of Economics ( email )

2329 West Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia BC V6T 1Z2
Canada

Shigehiro Serizawa (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

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Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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