Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies
16 Pages Posted: 16 May 2005
Date Written: January 19, 2005
We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: There is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaued domain.
Keywords: Strategy-Proofness, Social Choice Function, Allotment Economy, Uniform Rule
JEL Classification: D61, D63, D71, D78, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation