Do Consumers Pay for One-Stop Banking? Evidence from a Non-Standard Revenue Function

94-01

Posted: 15 Apr 1998

See all articles by Lawrence B. Pulley

Lawrence B. Pulley

College of William and Mary - Mason School of Business

Allen N. Berger

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business; Wharton Financial Institutions Center; European Banking Center

David B. Humphrey

Florida State University - Department of Finance

Date Written: August 1993

Abstract

Synergies in providing financial services can reduce costs due to joint production (cost economies of scope) or raise revenues due to joint consumption (revenue economies of scope). Cost economies of scope between bank deposits and loans were found to be small elsewhere. Revenue economies of scope are investigated here for the first time and found to be non-existent over 1978-1990 for both small and large banks and for those on or off the revenue-efficient frontier. The lack of synergies between deposits and loans--where benefits are most likely to occur--suggests few synergies from an expansion of banking powers.

JEL Classification: G21, L89, D20

Suggested Citation

Pulley, Lawrence B. and Berger, Allen N. and Humphrey, David B., Do Consumers Pay for One-Stop Banking? Evidence from a Non-Standard Revenue Function (August 1993). 94-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6987

Lawrence B. Pulley

College of William and Mary - Mason School of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
United States

Allen N. Berger (Contact Author)

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business ( email )

1705 College St
Francis M. Hipp Building
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-576-8440 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)

Wharton Financial Institutions Center

Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367
United States

European Banking Center

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

David B. Humphrey

Florida State University - Department of Finance ( email )

Tallahassee, FL 32306-1042
United States
850-644-7899 (Phone)
850-668-6696 (Fax)

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