Collective Commonality and Tactical Polyvalence: How the Public Sector Can Design Itself to Mitigate Industrial Disputes and Optimise Social Justice

Abstract

While collective bargaining is a critical interdisciplinary topic, it is rarely analysed through the theoretical lenses of signalling theory (Spence, 1973), actor-network theory (Latour, 2005) or a combination of both theories. By utilising data from the British Social Attitudes Survey, the Labour Force Survey, and the OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database, this study adopts a multi-dataset quantitative approach. A two-way fixed effects regression reveals that trade union rights and annual wage growth rates have a significant effect on welfare expenditure decisions across OECD member states (Donado and Wälde, 2012); thus, the null of no correlation is rejected. Considering this direct fiscal impact, the thesis argues for the broader democratic necessity of collective bargaining, ultimately recommending the expansion of union rights in OECD countries facing restrictions on freedom of association.

Keywords: Unions, Wages, Signalling Theory, Actor Network Theory, Panel Data Models

JEL Classification: J52, J45, C72