The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of Regulatory Competition

22 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2005

See all articles by Ben Depoorter

Ben Depoorter

UC Law, San Francisco; Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society; Ugent - CASLE

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna; University of Miami, School of Law

Abstract

In this article we analyze the expected effects of regulatory overlap in European competition law resulting from Regulation 1/2003. Drawing upon recently developed economic theories of regulatory competition, our model foresees a number of qualitative adjustments resulting from this reform. On one hand, the direct applicability of the exemption provision should increase the overall amount of exemptions. On the other hand, a decentralized system permits private litigants' forum shopping, and parallel enforcement by multiple national competition authorities will drive up the number of infringement findings. Although the precise direction of substantive competition law is unclear, the overall effect is higher levels of regulatory activity. This entails not only greater administrative costs but also suggests increased transaction costs for doing business in the post-Regulation 1/2003 European Union.

Keywords: Regulatory competition, antitrust, european competition law

JEL Classification: K00, K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Depoorter, Ben and Parisi, Francesco, The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of Regulatory Competition. George Mason Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2005, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=699802 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.699802

Ben Depoorter (Contact Author)

UC Law, San Francisco ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Ugent - CASLE ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Belgium

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

University of Miami, School of Law ( email )

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