The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of Regulatory Competition

22 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2005  

Ben Depoorter

University of California Hastings College of Law; Ugent - CASLE; Stanford CIS

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Abstract

In this article we analyze the expected effects of regulatory overlap in European competition law resulting from Regulation 1/2003. Drawing upon recently developed economic theories of regulatory competition, our model foresees a number of qualitative adjustments resulting from this reform. On one hand, the direct applicability of the exemption provision should increase the overall amount of exemptions. On the other hand, a decentralized system permits private litigants' forum shopping, and parallel enforcement by multiple national competition authorities will drive up the number of infringement findings. Although the precise direction of substantive competition law is unclear, the overall effect is higher levels of regulatory activity. This entails not only greater administrative costs but also suggests increased transaction costs for doing business in the post-Regulation 1/2003 European Union.

Keywords: Regulatory competition, antitrust, european competition law

JEL Classification: K00, K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Depoorter, Ben and Parisi, Francesco, The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of Regulatory Competition. George Mason Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=699802 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.699802

Ben Depoorter (Contact Author)

University of California Hastings College of Law ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Ugent - CASLE ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Belgium

Stanford CIS ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

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