Public Choices and Special Interests in the Italian Corporate Law Reform (Scelte Pubbliche E Interessi Particolari Nella Riforma Delle Società Di Capitali)

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, No. 1, pp. 145-192, 2005

44 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2005

See all articles by Luca Enriques

Luca Enriques

University of Oxford Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

This article provides an interest-group analysis of the recent Italian corporate law reform. It shows, first, that the reform has been the outcome of two driving forces: the activism of legislative bureaucracies at various Ministries and the current parliamentary majority's willingness to have its leader acquitted from false accounting charges by reshaping the relevant criminal provisions (in fact, in order to make it more politically acceptable, this was done within a more general reform framework). It then shows that the reform has increased the rents of accountants, providers of services related to the companies register, public notaries, corporate lawyers and corporate law professors. Finally, it argues that the correspondingly higher costs for Italian firms are not offset by the purportedly greater flexibility of the new corporate law framework nor by the efficiency gains possibly stemming from new mandatory rules.

Note: Downloadable document is in Italian.

Keywords: Corporate Law, Italy, Interests groups, Public Choice, Rents, Corporate Law Reform

JEL Classification: G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Enriques, Luca, Public Choices and Special Interests in the Italian Corporate Law Reform (Scelte Pubbliche E Interessi Particolari Nella Riforma Delle Società Di Capitali). Mercato Concorrenza Regole, No. 1, pp. 145-192, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=701141

Luca Enriques (Contact Author)

University of Oxford Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
435
Abstract Views
2,477
rank
65,752
PlumX Metrics