International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting

21 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2005

See all articles by Wolfgang Buchholz

Wolfgang Buchholz

Universitaet Regensburg; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Alexander Haupt

University of Plymouth - Plymouth Business School; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Wolfgang Peters

European University Frankfurt

Abstract

This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of 'global' pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non-cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining.

Suggested Citation

Buchholz, Wolfgang and Haupt, Alexander and Peters, Wolfgang, International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 1, pp. 175-195, March 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=703318

Wolfgang Buchholz (Contact Author)

Universitaet Regensburg ( email )

D-93040 Regensburg, 93053
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Alexander Haupt

University of Plymouth - Plymouth Business School ( email )

Mast House
Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Wolfgang Peters

European University Frankfurt ( email )

Grosse Scharrnstr. 59
Frankfurt (Oder), Brandenburg 15230
Germany

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