Collusion in the Dutch Waste Collection Market

25 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2005

See all articles by Elbert Dijkgraaf

Elbert Dijkgraaf

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Erasmus University Rotterdam, SEOR-ECRi

Raymond Gradus

The Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

In this paper we analyse whether collusion exists in the Dutch waste collection market, which shows a high degree of concentration. Although scale effects might be in accordance with this market outcome, the question is whether this concentration is in fact a result of fair competition. Using data for (nearly) all Dutch municipalities we estimate whether collusion exists and what the impact is on tariffs for waste collection. The results indicate that high concentration increases prices and therefore (partly) offsets the advantage of contracting out. The presence of competing public firms might be essential to ensure more and fair competition.

Keywords: Waste collection, collusion, public-private firms, contracting out

JEL Classification: D43, L33, R51

Suggested Citation

Dijkgraaf, Elbert and Gradus, Raymond, Collusion in the Dutch Waste Collection Market (January 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=703943 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.703943

Elbert Dijkgraaf (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Erasmus University Rotterdam, SEOR-ECRi ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
H 7-34
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31 10 4082590 (Phone)
+31 10 4089650 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecri.nl

Raymond Gradus

The Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment ( email )

Den Haag
Netherlands

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