Corruption and Energy Efficiency in OECD Countries: Theory and Evidence

Posted: 22 Apr 2005

See all articles by Per G. Fredriksson

Per G. Fredriksson

University of Louisville - College of Business - Department of Economics; Institute for Corruption Studies

Herman R.J. Vollebergh

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Bilthoven); Tilburg Unversity ; CESifo Institute; Tilburg Sustainability Centre; Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Elbert Dijkgraaf

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Erasmus University Rotterdam, SEOR-ECRi

Abstract

We investigate the effect of corruption and industry sector size on energy policy outcomes. The main predictions of our theory are that: (i) greater corruptibility of policy makers reduces energy policy stringency; (ii) greater lobby group coordination costs (increased industry sector size) results in more stringent energy policy; and (iii) workers' and capital owners' lobbying efforts on energy policy are negatively related. These predictions are tested using a unique panel data set on the energy intensity of 11 sectors in 14 OECD countries for years 1982-1996. The evidence supports the predictions.

Keywords: Energy policy, political economy, corruption, collective action

JEL Classification: Q48, D73, D78

Suggested Citation

Fredriksson, Per G. and Vollebergh, Herman R.J. and Dijkgraaf, Elbert, Corruption and Energy Efficiency in OECD Countries: Theory and Evidence. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=703969

Per G. Fredriksson

University of Louisville - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Louisville, KY 40292
United States

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Herman R.J. Vollebergh

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Bilthoven) ( email )

Bezuidenhoutseweg 30
Den Haag, 2594 AV
Netherlands
+31655736920 (Phone)

Tilburg Unversity ( email )

Tilburg
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/h.r.j.vollebergh.htm

CESifo Institute ( email )

Munich
Germany

Tilburg Sustainability Centre ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, North Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Elbert Dijkgraaf (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Erasmus University Rotterdam, SEOR-ECRi ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
H 7-34
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31 10 4082590 (Phone)
+31 10 4089650 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecri.nl

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