Overconfidence vs. Market Efficiency in the National Football League

63 Pages Posted: 31 May 2005 Last revised: 19 Oct 2022

See all articles by Cade Massey

Cade Massey

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Richard H. Thaler

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

A question of increasing interest to researchers in a variety of fields is whether the incentives and experience present in many "real world" settings mitigate judgment and decision-making biases. To investigate this question, we analyze the decision making of National Football League teams during their annual player draft. This is a domain in which incentives are exceedingly high and the opportunities for learning rich. It is also a domain in which multiple psychological factors suggest teams may overvalue the "right to choose" in the draft -- non-regressive predictions, overconfidence, the winner's curse and false consensus all suggest a bias in this direction. Using archival data on draft-day trades, player performance and compensation, we compare the market value of draft picks with the historical value of drafted players. We find that top draft picks are overvalued in a manner that is inconsistent with rational expectations and efficient markets and consistent with psychological research.

Suggested Citation

Massey, Cade and Thaler, Richard H., Overconfidence vs. Market Efficiency in the National Football League (April 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11270, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=705590

Cade Massey

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Richard H. Thaler (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-5208 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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