Precedent Transfer in Coordination Games: An Experiment

Posted: 26 Apr 2005

Abstract

We consider the power of precedent transfer as an equilibrium selection principle in the minimum effort game. Our experiments show that groups of players are able to transfer efficient historical precedents to the minimum effort game.

Keywords: coordination, historical precedent, information

JEL Classification: C72, C92

Suggested Citation

Devetag, Giovanna, Precedent Transfer in Coordination Games: An Experiment. Economics Letters, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=705723

Giovanna Devetag (Contact Author)

Luiss Guido Carli ( email )

Via Salvini 2
Roma, 00197
Italy

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