Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation

67 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2005

See all articles by Thomas Nachbar

Thomas Nachbar

University of Virginia School of Law

Abstract

Within intellectual property, Darcy v. Allen and the Statute of Monopolies are frequently, almost reflexively, invoked as establishing a baseline norm of economic freedom from which governments depart when they grant exclusive rights to deal in any trade or article of commerce. Against this free-market backdrop, all such grants are suspect, and only those that are justified by reference to their originality or utility are valid. Rejecting the dominant view of Darcy and the Statute of Monopolies, the paper provides a more detailed political and legislative history of both the compromise leading to Darcy and the adoption of the Statute of Monopolies than any to date, and consequently demonstrates that their true importance lies in their political, not economic, content. This reinterpretation suggests that both events are best viewed through the lens of political accountability, not economic doctrine. The paper concludes by considering the ramifications that this new understanding has for modern debates about intellectual property.

Suggested Citation

Nachbar, Thomas, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, p. 1313, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=707167

Thomas Nachbar (Contact Author)

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