Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics

25 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2005

See all articles by Kevin S. Milligan

Kevin S. Milligan

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Smart

University of Toronto - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

We investigate the political and economic factors influencing the allocation of regional development grants for a panel of Canadian electoral districts in the 1988-2001 period. In a strong party system such as Canada's, models of political competition predict little role for individual legislators, as party leaders allocate resources to maximize party success. While spending is targeted toward some "swing" districts, we do also find it is higher in districts represented by members of the government party, especially those in the federal Cabinet, and those of lower seniority. We develop a model featuring bargaining over legislative and non-legislative favours that is consistent with the evidence.

JEL Classification: D72, H25, R58

Suggested Citation

Milligan, Kevin S. and Smart, Michael, Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics (April 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=710903

Kevin S. Milligan

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics ( email )

997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1
Canada

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Michael Smart (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

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Institute for Policy Analysis
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Canada
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416-978-6713 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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