The Structure of Political Satisfaction

Posted: 29 Apr 2005

See all articles by Chris van Klaveren

Chris van Klaveren

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)

Henriette Maassen van den Brink

University of Amsterdam

B.M.S. van Praag

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Tinbergen Institute in Amsterdam; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: June 15, 2004

Abstract

In this paper we use a two-layer model in which we are able to empirically measure direct and indirect effects of satisfaction with public policies based on purely subjective preferences of citizens. We are also able to distinguish which individuals are dissatisfied the most. The estimation results suggest that the specified public policies are all significant except the respondent's attitude with respect to policies regarding social security, the amount of social benefits and immigration policy. Within the political context of 2001 left wing voters are less satisfied with policies aiming to realize a 24 hours economy than right-wing voters. Right wing voters are dissatisfied with immigration policies.

JEL Classification: I28, I38, H11

Suggested Citation

Klaveren, Chris van and Maassen van den Brink, Henriette and van Praag, Bernard, The Structure of Political Satisfaction (June 15, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=711855

Chris van Klaveren (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Henriette Maassen van den Brink

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 020 525 4311/4288 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www1.fee.uva.nl/scholar/mdw/hmvdb/main.htm

Bernard Van Praag

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
31 20 5256018 (Phone)
31 20 5256013 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tinbergen Institute in Amsterdam

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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