Environmental Innovations: Institutional Impacts on Co-Operations for Sustainable Development

28 Pages Posted: 2 May 2005

See all articles by Helmut Karl

Helmut Karl

University of Bochum - Faculty of Economics

Antje Möller

University of Bochum

Ximena Matus

University of Bochum

Edgar Grande

Munich University of Technology

Robert Kaiser

Technische Universität München (TUM) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

A suitable strategy for achieving sustainable development is to foster environmental innovations. Environmental innovations, however, suffer from so-called "double externalities", because apart from innovation spillovers they also improve the quality of public environmental goods, which can be used without cost by free riders. Those innovation spillovers can be avoided through co-operation. Furthermore co-operations can be considered as advantageous because environmental innovations often depend on interaction in research and development, production, selling and disposal. This paper analyzes as to what extent institutional factors impact co-operative arrangements of innovative organizations in the development of new environmental technologies. It applies a multi-dimensional institutional analysis focusing not only on institutional arrangements which exist among organizations but also on opportunities and constraints provided by the institutional environment in which these organizations are embedded. Expanding the existing research we will conclude what kind of policy measure may support the success within networks of environmental oriented innovators.

Keywords: Environmental innovation, Co-operation, Sustainability, Institutional analysis, Policy measures

JEL Classification: L14, O31, Q55, Q58

Suggested Citation

Karl, Helmut and Möller, Antje and Matus, Ximena and Grande, Edgar and Kaiser, Robert, Environmental Innovations: Institutional Impacts on Co-Operations for Sustainable Development (April 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 58.05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=712482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.712482

Helmut Karl (Contact Author)

University of Bochum - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ruhr University of Bochum
Faculty of Economics
D-44780 Bochum, DE 44780
Germany
+49 0 234 3225332 (Phone)
+49 0 234 707716 (Fax)

Antje Möller

University of Bochum ( email )

Universitätsstraße 150
Bochum, NRW 44780
Germany
+49 0 234 / 3225332 (Phone)
+49 0 234 / 707716 (Fax)

Ximena Matus

University of Bochum ( email )

Universitätsstraße 150
Bochum, NRW 44780
Germany

Edgar Grande

Munich University of Technology ( email )

Arcisstrasse 21
Munich, 80333
Germany

Robert Kaiser

Technische Universität München (TUM) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Lothstr. 17
Munich, D-80335
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.robert-kaiser.de

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