Why Does Capital Flow to Rich States?

61 Pages Posted: 25 May 2006 Last revised: 27 May 2008

See all articles by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan

Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan

University of Maryland - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Koc University, Graduate School of Business

Ariell Reshef

Paris School of Economics (PSE); CNRS; Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - CES/CNRS; Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales (CEPII)

Bent E. Sørensen

University of Houston - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Oved Yosha

Tel Aviv University - The Eitan Berglas School of Economics (Deceased)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

The magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows does not fit neo-classical models. The 50 U.S. states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to capital flows, which makes them an ideal testing ground for neoclassical models. We develop a simple frictionless open economy model with perfectly diversified ownership of capital and find that capital flows between the U.S. states are consistent with the model. Therefore, the small size and "wrong" direction of net international capital flows are likely due to frictions associated with national borders and not due to inherent flaws in the neoclassical model.

Suggested Citation

Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem and Reshef, Ariell and Sorensen, Bent E. and Yosha, Oved, Why Does Capital Flow to Rich States? (May 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11301. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=714073

Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Koc University, Graduate School of Business ( email )

Rumelifeneri Yolu
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Istanbul, 34450
Turkey

Ariell Reshef

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

CNRS ( email )

France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - CES/CNRS ( email )

106 bv de l'Hôpital
Paris, 75013
France

Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales (CEPII) ( email )

9 rue Georges Pitard
Paris Cedex 15, F-75015
France

Bent E. Sorensen

University of Houston - Department of Economics ( email )

204 McElhinney Hall
Houston, TX 77204-5882
United States
713-743-3841 (Phone)
713-743-3798 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Oved Yosha

Tel Aviv University - The Eitan Berglas School of Economics (Deceased)

N/A

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