Control and Incentives in Organizational Design

285

Posted: 5 Jul 1998

See all articles by J. E. Ricart

J. E. Ricart

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Josep M. Rosanas

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Date Written: January 1995

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to set up a more general formulation of the principal-agent model that can accommodate these organizational situations, rather common in the world of business management, for the purpose of deriving useful propositions about both organizational design and the process of influencing the decisions made by agents on behalf of the principals. We will proceed as follows. We will describe the process of delegation of authority, and structure it along the lines of agency theory, we will examine the information requirements for decision-making, and their implications in the organizational context. We will establish the formal model of the problems we want to study, and we will explore the implications and consequences of such a model.

JEL Classification: C51

Suggested Citation

Enric Ricart, Joan and Rosanas, Josep M., Control and Incentives in Organizational Design (January 1995). 285, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7142

Joan Enric Ricart (Contact Author)

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
34 3 204 40 00 (Phone)
34 3 280 11 77 (Fax)

Josep M. Rosanas

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
34 932534200 (Phone)
34 932534343 (Fax)

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