On Container Versus Time Based Inspection Policies in Invasive Species Management

26 Pages Posted: 7 May 2005

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Peter Nijkamp

VU University of Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

We study the problem of precluding biological invasions caused by ships transporting internationally traded goods in containers between different regions of the world. Using the long run expected net cost (LRENC) of inspections as the apposite managerial objective, we address the following important question: Given that inspection is a cyclical activity, is the LRENC lower when a port manager's inspector inspects cargo upon the arrival of a specified number of containers (container policy) or is this LRENC lower when this inspector inspects cargo at fixed points in time (temporal policy)? We construct a queuing theoretic model and show that in an inspection cycle, irrespective of whether the inspection policy choice is made on the basis of an explicit optimization exercise or on the basis of rules of thumb, the container policy is superior to the temporal policy because the container policy results in lower LRENC from inspection activities.

Keywords: Biological invasion, inspection policy, queuing theory, uncertainty

JEL Classification: Q28, L51

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Nijkamp, Peter, On Container Versus Time Based Inspection Policies in Invasive Species Management (May 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=715381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.715381

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

Peter Nijkamp

VU University of Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 4446091 (Phone)
+31 20 4445611 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
89
Abstract Views
1,324
rank
346,317
PlumX Metrics