Discretionary Power Causes Divergent Politics

UC Davis Working Paper #97-24

Posted: 27 Mar 1998

See all articles by John E. Roemer

John E. Roemer

Yale University - Department of Political Science; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: September 1997

Abstract

Consider electoral competition between two candidates, in which there is a single-dimensional issue space. The simplest way to get the result that, in Nash equilibrium, candidates propose different policies, is to assume that (1) candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences, and (2) candidates have preferences over policies. This note shows there is another interesting way to get the result of differentiated equilibrium policies. Assume there is a single-dimensional issue space in which candidates must announce a campaign issue, but there is also a discretionary issue, something on which no position will be taken during the campaign, but the victorious candidate will have the power to implement. For example, the campaign issue could be the tax rate, and the discretionary issue, the appointment of federal judges. It is shown that, if candidates differ on the discretionary issue, and voters know that, then the positions they will announce on the campaign issue will diverge. Indeed, an example is given in which, as the distance between candidates on the discretionary issue becomes large, their equilibrium announcements on the campaign issue converge to their respective ideal points.

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Roemer, John E., Discretionary Power Causes Divergent Politics (September 1997). UC Davis Working Paper #97-24. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=71568

John E. Roemer (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States
203-432-5249 (Phone)
203-432-6196 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jer39/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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