Overcomplying for Profit

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 267-269, 2005

Posted: 9 May 2005

See all articles by Naoufel Mzoughi

Naoufel Mzoughi

INRA Ecodéveloppement

Gilles Grolleau

Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA

Abstract

To maximize their profit, multinationals can design and implement the same and toughest standard in all locations, regardless of domestic regulations. We discuss this kind of overcompliance and stress its underpinnings. Some potential extensions are suggested.

Keywords: Overcompliance, Regulation, Home/Host Country, Standards

JEL Classification: L51, Q52

Suggested Citation

Mzoughi, Naoufel and Grolleau, Gilles, Overcomplying for Profit. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 267-269, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=717501

Naoufel Mzoughi (Contact Author)

INRA Ecodéveloppement ( email )

Domaine Saint-Paul - Site Agroparc
Avignon cedex 9, 84914
France

Gilles Grolleau

Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA ( email )

France

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