Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation

43 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2005 Last revised: 17 Jul 2009

See all articles by Matias Iaryczower

Matias Iaryczower

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.

Suggested Citation

Iaryczower, Matias and Spiller, Pablo T. and Tommasi, Mariano, Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation (May 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11317. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=721105

Matias Iaryczower

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 951477
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States

Pablo T. Spiller (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )

545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1502 (Phone)
510-642-2826 (Fax)

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, Buenos Aires B1644BID
Argentina
+5411-4725-7020 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.udesa.edu.ar/tommasi/index.htm

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