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Selling to Overconfident Consumers

50 Pages Posted: 17 May 2005 Last revised: 24 Sep 2009

Michael D. Grubb

Boston College

Date Written: May 2, 2008

Abstract

Consumers may overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts. This overconfidence creates an incentive for both monopolists and competitive firms to offer tariffs with included quantities at zero marginal cost, followed by steep marginal charges. This matches observed cell-phone service pricing plans in the US and elsewhere. An alternative explanation with common priors can be ruled out in favor of overconfidence based on observed customer usage patterns for a major US cellular phone service provider. The model can be reinterpreted to explain the use of flat rates and late fees in rental markets, and teaser rates on loans. Nevertheless, firms may benefit from consumers losing their overconfidence.

Keywords: overconfidence, screening, nonlinear pricing, three-part tariff, cellular, telecommunications

JEL Classification: D4, D8, L1

Suggested Citation

Grubb, Michael D., Selling to Overconfident Consumers (May 2, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=721701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.721701

Michael D. Grubb (Contact Author)

Boston College ( email )

United States
617-552-1569 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www2.bc.edu/michael-grubb/

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