Cooperation Under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment

Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-05

47 Pages Posted: 18 May 2005

See all articles by Matthias M. Cinyabuguma

Matthias M. Cinyabuguma

University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC) - Department of Economics

Louis Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics

Talbot Page

Brown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a coexpulsion baseline. Expulsions were strictly of the lowest contributors, and there was an exceptionally strong fall-off in contributions in the last period, when the expulsion threat was unavailable. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is one device that helps groups to provide public goods.

Keywords: Public goods, collective action, punishment

JEL Classification: C91, H41, D23

Suggested Citation

Cinyabuguma, Matthias M. and Putterman, Louis G. and Page, Talbot, Cooperation Under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment (2004). Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=724203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724203

Matthias M. Cinyabuguma

University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC) - Department of Economics ( email )

1000 Hilltop Circle
Baltimore, MD 21250
United States

Louis G. Putterman (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-3837 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Talbot Page

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-1988 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
109
Abstract Views
938
rank
278,293
PlumX Metrics