The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information

Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-18

18 Pages Posted: 18 May 2005

See all articles by Geoffroy de Clippel

Geoffroy de Clippel

Brown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo (1994) to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.

Suggested Citation

de Clippel, Geoffrey, The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information (2004). Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-18. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=724230 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724230

Geoffrey De Clippel (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States

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