Equity, Envy and Efficiency Under Asymmetric Information

Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-19

8 Pages Posted: 18 May 2005

See all articles by Geoffroy de Clippel

Geoffroy de Clippel

Brown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

The set of fair (i.e. envy free and efficient) allocation rules may be empty in well-behaved pure exchange economies if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting. In addition, there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another.

Suggested Citation

de Clippel, Geoffrey, Equity, Envy and Efficiency Under Asymmetric Information (2004). Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=724232 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724232

Geoffrey De Clippel (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States

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