'Branded Generics' as a Strategy to Limit Cannibalization of Pharmaceutical Markets
Managerial and Decision Economics, Jun-Aug 2007, Volume: 28, Issue: 4, pp. 251-265.
38 Pages Posted: 19 May 2005 Last revised: 21 May 2012
Date Written: May 1, 2005
This paper demonstrates how, by introducing a generic version of its previously-patented product, a branded firm can influence the equilibrium in the generic segment of the market for the product. This in turn can increase the firm's profits from selling the branded version. We then use structural estimates from previous literature to calculate the magnitude of the effects in the generic and branded segments.
Keywords: Pharmaceuticals, generic drugs, oligopoly, strategy
JEL Classification: L13, L41, L65, D43
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation