'Branded Generics' as a Strategy to Limit Cannibalization of Pharmaceutical Markets

Managerial and Decision Economics, Jun-Aug 2007, Volume: 28, Issue: 4, pp. 251-265.

38 Pages Posted: 19 May 2005 Last revised: 21 May 2012

See all articles by David Reiffen

David Reiffen

U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)

Michael R. Ward

University of Texas at Arlington - College of Business Administration - Department of Economics; ZEW, Mannheim

Date Written: May 1, 2005

Abstract

This paper demonstrates how, by introducing a generic version of its previously-patented product, a branded firm can influence the equilibrium in the generic segment of the market for the product. This in turn can increase the firm's profits from selling the branded version. We then use structural estimates from previous literature to calculate the magnitude of the effects in the generic and branded segments.

Keywords: Pharmaceuticals, generic drugs, oligopoly, strategy

JEL Classification: L13, L41, L65, D43

Suggested Citation

Reiffen, David and Ward, Michael Robert, 'Branded Generics' as a Strategy to Limit Cannibalization of Pharmaceutical Markets (May 1, 2005). Managerial and Decision Economics, Jun-Aug 2007, Volume: 28, Issue: 4, pp. 251-265., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=724401 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724401

David Reiffen

U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) ( email )

Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20581
United States

Michael Robert Ward (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Arlington - College of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )

330 Business Building
Box 19479
Arlington, TX 76019
United States
817-272-3090 (Phone)
817-272-3145 (Fax)

ZEW, Mannheim ( email )

D-68034 Mannheim
Germany

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