Deviant or Different? Corporate Governance in Japan and Germany

10 Pages Posted: 21 May 2005

See all articles by Ronald Dore

Ronald Dore

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

There are good reasons for national differences in corporate governance, differences in the distributional outcomes desired and differences in motivational resources; material sticks and carrots are not the only ways of keeping top managers efficient, honest and dynamic. Yet, too often discussions of corporate governance assume the Anglo-Saxon model to be normal and others "deviant" - a notion to be challenged, but nevertheless the dominant assumption among the "reformers" of corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Most of the "reforms" in those two countries over the past decade have purported to be about making top managers more honest and efficient. In fact their purport has more often been to change distributional outcomes, favouring shareholders at the expense of employees.

Suggested Citation

Dore, Ronald, Deviant or Different? Corporate Governance in Japan and Germany. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 437-446, May 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=725892

Ronald Dore (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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