On Some Auction Rules for Amicable Divorce in Equal Share Partnerships

14 Pages Posted: 23 May 2005

See all articles by Yvan Lengwiler

Yvan Lengwiler

University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Elmar Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

Partnerships form and dissolve. Dissolution often requires a change in property rights, from joint to single ownership, in the hands of one of the partners. This calls for a dissolution rule that assigns full property rights to the partner who makes the best use of these assets, and assures fair compensation of those who give up their ownership rights. The present paper analyzes two simple auction rules to solve these problems.

Keywords: Auctions, partnership dissolution, divorce rules, inheritance rules, mechanism design, revenue equivalence theorem

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Lengwiler, Yvan and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., On Some Auction Rules for Amicable Divorce in Equal Share Partnerships (February 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=727763 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.727763

Yvan Lengwiler

University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics (WWZ) ( email )

Peter Merian-Weg 6
PO Box
Basel, CH-4002
Switzerland
+41 61 267 3369 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://wwz.unibas.ch/lengwiler

Elmar G. Wolfstetter (Contact Author)

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.hu-berlin.de/wt1wo/staff/wolfstetter/index.html

Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )

Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
115
Abstract Views
1,121
rank
240,510
PlumX Metrics