On Some Auction Rules for Amicable Divorce in Equal Share Partnerships

Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.727763

On Some Auction Rules for Amicable Divorce in Equal Share Partnerships

14 Pages Posted: 23 May 2005

See all articles by Yvan Lengwiler

Yvan Lengwiler

University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

Partnerships form and dissolve. Dissolution often requires a change in property rights, from joint to single ownership, in the hands of one of the partners. This calls for a dissolution rule that assigns full property rights to the partner who makes the best use of these assets, and assures fair compensation of those who give up their ownership rights. The present paper analyzes two simple auction rules to solve these problems.

Keywords: Auctions, partnership dissolution, divorce rules, inheritance rules, mechanism design, revenue equivalence theorem

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Lengwiler, Yvan and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., On Some Auction Rules for Amicable Divorce in Equal Share Partnerships (February 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=727763 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.727763